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ABS TRACT
This paper examines the structure ofexpectations of the weekly money
supply announcement in the late l970s. The data usedare from a weekly
telephone survey of money market participants. Therationality and struc-
ture of expectations are explored with the dataorganized in three ways:
the mean response to each weeklysurvey, the pooled sample of individual
responses, and time series of responses by each individual in thesurvey.
The effect of data aggregation onrationality tests is investigated. The
structure of the expectations data are also examined and it isfound that
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The emphasis on the role ofmoney in macroeconomic theory and policy
discussions in recent years has led to an increasedinterest in expectations
concerning the growth of the money supply. Although thestructure and
accuracy of expectations are of paramount theoretical importance, these
issues are difficult to analyze becauseexpectations are not easily observ—
able. Occasionally, directly observableexpectations from surveys can be
utilized. In this paper we analyze the structure ofexpectations concerning
the weekly announcement of the change in themoney supply with data from a
survey of forecasts madebyfinancial market participants.
The weekly announcement of themoney supply is often viewed as an im-
portant piece of information concerning past and futuremonetary policy and
financial market conditions. Consequently, financialmarket participants
make an effort to forecast the announcement anduse the announced information
in evaluating the state of theeconomy. Elsewhere (Urich and Wachtel [1981];
Urich [1982]), we have analyzed the effect of these expectations and forecast
errors on market interest rates.
The data used in this study were obtained fromMoney Market Services,
a San Francisco firm which has collectedweekly forecasts of thechangein the money supply from a telephone poli of about 50 government securities
dealers since mid—1977. The Federal Reserve's data release emphasizes the
week—to—week change in the money supply, arid Money Market Services
obtains forecasts of the change in the narrowly defined money supply, Mi. It
is these data that are given the most attention by market participants.1
We have data for 95 weeks extending from the beginning of March 1978 to
the end of January 1980. The analysis of the structure of expectations re-
quires the identification of individuals' responses over time which could
only be made with a sub—sample of 20 regular survey respondents. For the
analysis of forecast accuracy, all the available data could be utilized, but
there were no apparent differences between the results presented below and
those with the entire data set.
The empirical examination of the data is divided into two sections. The
first is concerned with standard tests for the rationality of forecasts and
the second presents estimates of some models of expectations formation.
Although this study represents the first examination of the data just
described, there are several studies of the structure and rationality of
directly measured expectations of other economic data. The most familiar of
these is the Livingston data on price expectations which makes use of a semi-
annual survey of forecasters that began in 1947.2 The Livingston data are,
however, very different from the data used here. They reflect expectations
1Money Market Services conducted its poii on Tuesday and again on Thursday
morning to obtain expectations of the change in the money supply which was
announced on Thursday. In this paper, we only use expectations from the
Thursday survey, since preliminary work indicated little difference between
the two surveys. The survey procedures were changed when the
money supply announcement was shifted to Friday in January 1980, after the
end of oursampleperiod.
2For a description, see Wachtel (1977) and for a discussion of modelling and
rationality, see Figlewski and Wachtel (1981). Friedman (1980) examines
interest rate expectations.of economic events over a 6 or more monthhorizon, while our data concerns
expectations formed each week of the data announced at the end of theweek.
Thus, the structures of the expectations formationprocess are likely to be
very different.
Rationality of Forecasts
The money Supply change forecasts made by financial marketparticipants
should make use of all available relevant informationor, in other words,
be rational forecasts. Two common tests forrationality are applied to these
data: tests for the unbiasedness and for theefficiency of the forecasts.
Forecasts are unbiased if the null hypothesis (ct, )= (0,1) cannot be re-
jected from the regression:
(1)
where M is the announced change in themoney supply and is the expected
change.
The test for efficiency is based on the idea that rational forecasts
utilize any available information which affects the actualmoney SUPi.
As discussed by Pesando (1975), forecasts are weak—form efficientif the
actual and expected money supply series share a common time seriesstructure.
Experimentation with various ARIMA specifications indicates that a second
3The actualchange in the money supply used throughout the paper is defined
as M =m
—m1,where m is the first announcement of themoney supply in week t.The results reported are the same when themoney supply change is defined as m —m1,where m1 is the revision for the money supply in week
t—l announces in week t.—4—
order autoregressive structure provides an adequate representation of the
actual weekly money supply change data:
(2)
If the expectations are efficient, they should incorporate this information
in the same fashion:
(3)
That is, efficiency implies that o' =j,).Adirect
test of the efficiency hypothesis is from the regression:
(M—E) =+ iM1 +2M2 (4)
Expectations are efficient if the null hypothesis that (y0, y, y2) =
4
(0, 0, 0) cannot be rejected.
Even if the time series model given by equation (2) is misspecif led,
rejection of the null hypothesis on the coefficients of equation (4) implies
that efficiency is rejected. Non—zero coefficients in equation (4) indicate
that there exists readily available information (prior changes in the money
supply) which could be used to systematically reduce the forecast errors.
That is, there is evidence of inefficient use of available information.
4For both the unbiasedness and efficiency hypotheses, the test statistics
are based on the joint distribution of the regression coefficients. Generally,
for the model y =X8+ u where b Is the least squares estimator of ,the
test statistic for the null hypothesis thatis equal to the particular
value o is:
F = — b)'X'x(0 —b)/KS
Where K is the number of elements in the vector b, S is the standard error
of the regression and F is distributed with K and N— degrees of freedom.Efficiency and unbiasedness tests of survey data are usually applied
to a time series of the mean survey responses. This procedure is common
because individual survey responses are often unavailable. However, it
introduces an aggregation bias which can severely distort the results of
rationality tests, as will be discussed below. Results with the survey
means are shown to illustrate the extent of the bias. For this study, a
pooled cross section—time series of individual survey responses is utilized
to test for rationality.
It is also possible that some but not all of the respondents provide
rational forecasts. Thus, it is useful to test for differencesamong respon-
dents by examining the rationality of each individual. For thispurpose, the
data are organized into 20 time series, each one of which is the weekly fore-
casts of an individual respondent. An additional benefit of this procedure
is that it avoids a problem associated with the pooled sample. That sample
is so large that small forecasts errors lead to rejection of the rationality
hypotheses when standard statistical tests are applied.
An analysis of variance is used to test the pooled sample against
the set of time series for each respondent. To anticipate our results, the
pooled sample is rejected in favor of this last alternative for both testing
equations. Finally, the tests on the individual time series will show a
greater incidence of forecast bias than would be indicated by chance and
little indication of informational inefficiency. The discussion begins with
the tests for unbiasedness.
Figlewski and Wachtel (forthcoming) have shown that the use of a sample
of survey means for the unbiasedness tests introduces a specification error.—6—
The survey mean may not be a rational forecast even when all individual
forecasts are rational. The precise relationship between the pooled
and survey mean has been investigated by Dietrich and Joines [forthcoming].
The slope coefficient in the unbiasedness equation (1) from the pooled
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where EM. is the money supply change expectation of the th respondent in
week t, FI is the mean survey response in week t, EM is the overall mean
and T and N are the number of weeks and respondents, respectively. It is
clear from the above that M >P•With our data, the slope coefficients
in both the bias equations are less than one, so M, which is larger, is
closer to one. Aggregation to survey means then increases the likelihood of
accepting the null hypothesis of unbiasedness.
Results for the unbiasedness tests are shown in the top panel of Table 1.
For the sake of comparison, results with the survey means are shown in equa-
tion (1). They are followed by results with the pooled sample, equation (2).
It is clear that the aggregation of the sample into a time series of survey
means has a large effect on the results. As discussed earlier, 8 is closer
to unity with the aggregated sample.5 Thus, the data in that common form
suggests that the null hypothesis of unbiasedness cannot be rejected.
5Similar aggregation bias results were found by Figlewski and Wachtel (1981)
in a study of the Livingston survey data on inflationary expectations.With the preferred pooled sample =.77andthenullhypothesis
is rejected.6 However, this result may besuspect because of
heteroscedasticity among the residuals from eachsurvey week. The standard
errors of the residuals for each week from equation (2) in Table 1are used
to make a heteroscedasticity correction. Each observation isdivided by the
standard error of the residuals for that week fromequation (2). The re—
estimated equation is (3) in Table 1 which indicatesan ever larger slope
bias.
As noted earlier, an alternative way ofexamining the data is to test
for the rationality of the forecasts of individualrespondents. The test
results for the 20 individuals in the sample are shown in Table2. The
disaggregation of the tooled data sample into separateregressions £ or each
respondent adds significantly to the explanatorypower of the unbiasedness
equation. That is, the model estimated in Table 1, equation 2:
=a+ it + u.
is tested against the alternative model:
M =a.+ .EM+ u. i1,. ..,20 t 1 1it it:
shownin Table 2.The F—statistic which is 6.90 with (2,1852) degrees
of freedom indicates that the model using the pooled datasample can be
rejected. In addition, the null hypothesis of unbiasedness can be rejected
at the 5% level for 11 of the 20 forecasters and at the 1% level for 2 of the
20. There is clearly a greater incidence of bias than would be expected from
is easy to reject the null hypothesis because theregression is esti-
mated from a large number of observations which determinesthe degrees of
freedom. However, there are not thatmany truly independent observations
since the dependent variable has values whichrepeat for each survey
respondent.—8—
sampling variation. The evidence of bias in forecast behavior in the sample period
is therefore quite strong; about half of the forecasters were making systema-
tic errors in this period.7
The presence of serial correlation in the unbiasedness equations would
indicate systematic errors that could readily be corrected. For the 20
individual respondents, all but one of the equations show no indication of
firstorder serial correlation. Examination of higher order autocorrelations
of the forecast errors for each of the 20 individuals provided only a few
instancesof significant autocorrelations.
Turning now to the efficiency test, only results with the pooled sample
are shown since the least squares estimates of the coefficients for the
pooled and means samples are exactly the same because the right hand side
variables are the samef or each individual. Although the F—statistics f or
the efficiency tests in Table 1 indicate that the null hypothesis can be
rejected (i.e., prior changes in the money supply contain information that
could be used to reduce the forecast error), the coefficients are very small.8
Additional and perhaps more relevant evidence is provided by examining
the efficiency of each of the 20 individual respondents. This form of data
organization yields a significant increase in the explanatory power of the
7mismay not be surprising because the sample period is one of tumultuous
change in financial markets. In particular, the last 11 surveys (out of 95)
took place after the Federal Reserve's announced change in operating procedures
(on October 6, 1979). Although there are not enough surveys to examine
forecast behavior after the Fed's shift to monetary aggregates targets, it
is useful to see if these surveys are unduly influencing the reported results.
For the truncated sample, 9 out of 20 forecasters show bias (at the 5% significance
level). Thus, the conclusions are unaffected by the inclusion of the post—October
1979 data.
is interesting to note that when the sample of survey means is used,
the null hypothesis of efficiency is not rejected. The F—statistic is 1.13
with (3, 92) degrees of freedom.efficiency equations. The F—statistic for the comparison of the pooled
regression to the 20 individual regressions is 5.68, with (3, 1792) degrees
of freedom. The individual regressions lendsupport to the efficiency hypot-
hesis since none of the F—statistics for the null hypothesis ofzero coefficients
is significant at the five percent level (see Table 2)8aFurthermore, there
is no indication of serial correlationamong the residuals in the efficiency
tests for the individual respondents.
It is clear from the above discussion that the analysis of therationality
of money supply expectations is highly dependentupon the form of the data
used for the tests.If we apply the usual and erroneous procedures applied
to surveys of forecasts, which is to study the mean of the forecasts for
each survey, the data eems to support the rationality hypothesis.However,
when the same statistical tests are applied to the disaggregatedor pooled
data, the rationality hypotheses are resoundingly rejected. Due to thevery
large size of the pooled sample, economically inconsequential deviations from
rationality can lead to rejection of the null hypothesis. To avoid this problem,
the tests were also applied to the behavior over time of each individualres-
pondent. Furthermore, analysis of variance tests indicate that this form of
data organization is superior for both the unbiasedness and efficiency tests.
With this preferred sample design, a large proportion of the respondents
exhibit systematic biases, although they all provide informationally efficient
forecasts.
Finally, Theil's decomposition of the mean square error of forecast
provides a graphic picture of the forecast error. The decomposition of the
mean square error into three components is given by:
8aThlS result is also true when thesample period ends just before the change
in Federal Reserve operating procedures (October 6, 1979).E(M — ( — + ('—)2s+ (1—r2)S
whereis the slope coefficient from the unbiasedness test, S and
are the variance of EN and M, respectively, and r is the correlation of E24
and N. The three terms on the right hand side represent bias (the error
of the mean forecast), inefficiency and random effects, respectively. The
decomposition for the pooled sample (Table 1, equation (2)) is:
3.075 =(.537-.620)2+ (1 -.767)2(1.874)+ (1 -.377)(4.055)
The random term accounts for 94.4% of the mean square error, the bias term
2.3% and the inefficiency term 3.3%. There is very little variation in the
results of the decomposition among the 20 individual forecasters. The ran-
dom term is always more than 90% of the total mean square error.
The results indicate a remarkable similarity among the forecasters. In
all cases, the expected monetary change (EN) averages substantially more
than the actual chamge (M). For the whole sample, is about 1.7 times the
size of M, and the differences among the 20 individuals are very small. Con-
sequently, as seen in Table 2, the constant in the unbiasedness equation
is always negative and the slope always less than one.9 That is, all the
forecasters tend to over—estimate the change in the money supply in this
two—year period and their predictions are much less volatile than the actual
changes. The variance of the actual changes is more than twice the size of
the variance in the predicted changes.
Theil also suggested the inequality coefficient as a summary measure
of forecast accuracy. It is given by:
9Friedman's study of interest rate expectations and Figlewski and Wachtel's
study of inflationary expectations also indicate that the slope is less than
one.-1.1—
=
whichhas a value of zero if all forecasts are perfect andone if the f ore—
casts have the same mean square error as the naiveextrapolation of no change
in the money supply. The individualsurvey respondents are quite similar;
2
the values of U range from .67 to .87.
Structure of Expectations
The economics literature discusses several models for thestructure and
formation of expectations which can be applied to thesurvey data on the
expected change in the money supply. In this section, some standard model
structures are specified and estimated. The specificationsare tested against
each other to see whether the data favor a particularstructure for expecta-
tions formation. The particular models investigatedare for adaptive,
extrapolative andregressiveexpectations.




whichstates that the change in expectations is a partialresponse to pre-
vious forecast errors. The extrapolative modelsuggests that forecasts





Normally, adaptive and extrapolative influences would be indicatedby sig-
nificant positive estimates ofand y respectively. Negative coefficients
are evidence of regressive influences which means that thesurvey respondents
expect past errors or actual changes to be reversed. Alternatively, the-t2—






where M* is a normal change in the money supply and positive estimates of A
indicate that forecasts change because a regression towards M* is expected.
That is, if the last announced change (M1) is less than the normal change,
then expectations are adjusted up by some fraction of the deviation from
normal.
As written above, the models examine only the influence of the most re-
cent errors or changes in the money supply on EM. Since the money supply
expectations are formed each week, it seems reasonable to expect that the ex-
planatory variables for any number of earlier weeks could also influence the
current expectation. For example, the generalization of the adaptive model
is given by:
k
(EM —EMl o+.(M .— EM.) 11 1
whereestimates of the 's can be both positive and negative. Forecast
errors may at first be viewed as random and then re—interpreted as an indi-
cation of underlying change. Similarly, the persistence of errors in one
direction provides cumulative evidence about trends in the money supply which
should be interpreted differently than the one time occurrence of a forecast
error.
Estimates of the generalized models with the pooled time series—cross
section survey data are shown in Table 3 where the lags are arbitrarily
limited to eight weeks. The normal money supply change for the regressive
model is specified to be a constant, as explained below. The extrapolative
and regressive models (which include the same right hand side values, lags—13—
of M, in different function forms) have R2s that approach .5, which is twice
as large as the R2 from the adaptive model.
The first lag coefficient intheadaptive model isnegativewhich
suggestsa regressive influence. It indicates that an unanticipated increase
in the money supply leads forecasters to revise down theirexpected change.
That is, such a change is viewed as temporary and it isexpected that it
will be offset, at least partially, in the next week. The secondlagged
forecast error has a positive coefficient, which is onlyslightly larger in
absolute value than the coefficient on the first lag. Thelong term effect
of a forecast error, given by the sum of the lag coefficients, ispositive.
However, the sumofthe lag coefficients is .12, suggesting a rather small
impact of forecast eror on the revision of forecasts. Thus, the adaptive
model indicates that a forecast error is viewed initiallyas a statistical
or policy aberration which is expected to be offset by technical adjustments
in the money supply in the next week. However, maintained forecasterrors
lead to a small adjustment of expectations in the direction of theerror.
The consistently negative coefficients in the extrapolativeequation
and the explanatory power of the regressive equationssupport the presence
of regressive influences on the formation of expectations. The normalchange
in the money supply, M*, is determined by the Federal Reservepolicy targets.
The growth targets imply a small weekly change in themoney supply. Given
the short time period under study, and the small variation in Fedtargets,
the implied weekly change is virtually constant. In thiscase the regressive
model reduces to a regression on a constant and lagged values of M.Nega-
tive coefficients on the independent variables are consistent with theI- L —
regressivemodel.1° The resultsare supportive of the regressive hypot-
hesis. The first lag coefficient is very large and the sumissomewhat
smaller. This suggests that a change in the money supply thatisgreater
thanthe normal change is followed by an immediate reduction in the expected
change.
It is of interestto see whether any particular model structure domi-
nates the others. To do so, the pairwise test of alternative hypotheses
suggested by Davidson and MacKinnon [19811 can be applied. If thereare two
modelspecifications given by y =f(.)and y =g(.),respectively, then the
null hypothesis that the first specification is true can be tested by esti—
mating:
y =f(.)+
whereg is the predicted value from y =g().If the first specification
f(.), is true (relative to the alternative, g(.)), then will not differ
significantly from zero.
The t—statistics for the pairwise specification tests are given at the
bottom of Table 3. The model for the null hypotheses is listed at the left
and the alternatives are the column heads. The results indicate that the
regressive specification dominates the extrapolative. However, the adaptive
model adds explanatory power to both of the others and vice versa.
'°Since there is ample reason to think thattheFed often ignores, perhaps
temporarily, its aggregates targets, an alternative specification of M*was
considered. The effective Fed policy and the banking system's interaction
with it may be revealed by an examination of actual money supply changes in
the recent past. With this in mind, an alternative regressive equation which
specifies the normal change of the money supply as the average of observed
changes in the past 8 weeks was estimated. However, the test of alternative
specifications discussed in the text indicated that the specification
presented is superior.—1 5—
Since the various model specifications need not be viewedas mutually
exclusive, an appropriate model might include both regressive andadaptive
influences. An equation which includes both of these effectson the deter—
inination of expectations is given by:
EM —EM=.92-1.69M .+.82CM -EM.) —l —1 —i —1
MSE=1.25 R2 =.686
where the coefficients are the sums of three lag coefficients for boththe
regressive and adaptive terms. The equation indicates that both adaptive
and regressive influences play distinct and strong roles in the formation
of money supply expectations in this period. The of the equation is
substantially higher than for the individual models in Table 3. However,
these models are best viewed as descriptive of the influences that have
determined expectations in this period rather than estimates of the structure
of expectations formation that can be used for predictivepurposes.
Conclusions
In this paper we have used an especially rich set ofsurvey data to
examine the structure and formation of expectations of the weekly change
in the money supply. We emphasize the importance of using the data in
disaggregated form. Our main conclusions can be summarized as follows:
(i) Standard testing products for forecast rationality can be mis-
leading. Our preferred procedure is to examine the accuracy
of each of the survey respondents individually. For about half
of the respondents there is evidence of bias, although their fore-
casts are always efficient.-16--
(ii)The examination of models of expectations formation indicate that
there is a strong regressive influence on expectations. There is,
in addition, evidence that adaptive learning from past errors
characterizes the data. A model that includes both influences
explains well over half of the variation in the week—to—week change













































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Rationality or mdiv Luua1 loreca3ts
Lnbiasedness Test ErEi.c:iency Test
tr.dividuai a F DW F
1 —.21 .94 .29 1.02 2.05 1.70
2 —.15 .72* .28 4.51* 2.66 1.35
3 .04 .90 .32 .29 2.02 .74
4 —.19 .92 .33 1.18 2.00 1.05
5 _•37* .94 .35 3.31* 2.02 2.32
6 _.24* .85 .34 3.01 2.20 1.44
7 _.29* .85 .33 3.64* 2.13 2.28
8 —.15 .78 .27 2.73 2.12 [.34
9 —.13 .74 .23 3.61* 2.20 1.45
10 —.08 .67* .27 5.f2* 2.08 1.43
11 .02 .70* .22 2.63 2.23 1.14
12 —.18 —.81* .27 2.42 2.30 .73
13 .02 .63* .18 3•99* 2.32 .82
14 —.11 .80 .30 2.05 2.34 .49
15 —.17 .88 .31 1.42 2.38 1.08
16 —.04 •73* .29 3.38* 2.19 .34
17 —.06 .68* .20 3.61* 2.29 .56
18 —.08 .71* .27 4.11* 2.03 .80
19 —.03 .66* .25 5.13* 2.23 1.34
7(1 —lfi 4(4* 216 ic
Unbiasedriesstest:
M = EM
F—statisticis for H: (ci, 8)(0, 1).
Efficiencytest:
(M—F2'1)=y0+y1M1+y2M2
F—statisticis for H0: (-,y,y,) =(0,0,0).
*Indicates:
i) ci is more than one standard deviation away from 0,
ii) 8 is more than two standard deviations away from 1,
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